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ASYMMETRICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: WHAT TO EXPECT
Por Manuel Cereijo
Of the countless scenarios of terrorist mayhem, none quickens the pulse
quite like the menace of a nuclear bomb, and for good reason. A nuclear
weapon embodies essentially everything a terrorist could hope for: the
ability to kill at least tens of thousands of people at once, a fiery
explosion that reverberates globally in images of death and destruction,
and a lingering, lethal legacy, in the form of radioactive fallout.
Fortunately, most groups and terrorist nations are limited in their
resources and lack the infrastructure to build a nuclear bomb. But, why
build a bomb when there are far cheaper and simpler ways of waging
nuclear terror?
There are two other possibilities that, for their comparative
simplicity, would deliver much of the bang of a bomb. Flying a fully
fueled jumbo jet into a nuclear reactor is one. The other is using
radioactive nuclear materials to kill or sicken people or render tracts
of land uninhabitable by, for example, scattering the materials with a
conventional explosion.
Nuclear reactors are surrounded by a massive containment structure with
concrete-and-steel walls more than a meter thick. These containments
were designed to withstand earthquakes and extremely violent impacts,
but not the sort a plunging jumbo jet would cause if fully loaded with
fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in
Vienna, Austria.
In a 26 September release, the agency suggested that such an impact
would not trigger a runaway nuclear reaction, because automatic safety
systems would flood the reactor with water. A direct hit by a large,
fueled aircraft might nevertheless breach the containment and damage the
reactor, possibly causing a leak of radioactive steam and fallout.
The IAEA's assessment predicts that the worst damage would be confined
within 10 Kms. of the plant. Even so, dangerous levels of radioactivity
would likely persist for 10 to 15 years.
Radiological dispersion devices-the poor man's nuclear weapon-, or dirty
bomb, are another possibility likely to attract increasing interest from
terrorists. Scattering radiation without a nuclear explosion, they are a
near-term terrorist threat. Several nations-including a few sponsors of
terrorism-have dabbled in dispersion devices. In the 1980s, Iraq
produced and tested conventional bombs filled with radioactive
materials-apparently, spent fuel from its research reactors, according
to a 1991 report by the CIA. Cuba, by the way, has two research
reactors.
Spent fuel is the obvious choice for the radioactive material in a
terrorist device. Many tens of thousands of tons of it lie scattered
around the world, including small accumulations in Iraq, Iran, Algeria,
Libya, Syria, Pakistan, North Korea, and Cuba.
A single, half-ton spent fuel assembly from a reactor contains more than
enough radioactivity to put a transportation terminal or some other
strategic location out of action for months, or years, if the
radioactivity is well dispersed.
The most accessible nuclear device for any terrorist would be a
radiological dispersion bomb. This so-called 'dirty bomb' would consist
of waste by-products from nuclear reactors wrapped in conventional
explosives, which upon detonation would spew deadly radioactive
particles into the environment.
This is an expedient weapon, in that radioactive waste material is
relatively easy to obtain. Radioactive waste is widely found throughout
the world, and in general is not as well guarded as actual nuclear
weapons. In the United States, radioactive waste is located at more than
70 commercial nuclear power sites in 31 states. Enormous quantities also
exist overseas - in Europe and Japan in particular. Tons of wastes are
transported long distances, including between continents (Japan to
Europe and back).
Cuba, since 1988 has two experimental nuclear reactors in La Habana.
Very low power. One is a 10 Watts. The other is referred to as zero
Watts. They are used for nuclear medicine and research on nuclear
biotechnology. But they do generate nuclear waste.
In Russia, security for nuclear waste is especially poor, and the
potential for diversion and actual use by Islamic radicals has been
shown to be very real indeed. In 1996, Islamic rebels from the
break-away province of Chechnya planted, but did not detonate, such a
device in Moscow's Izmailovo park to demonstrate Russia's vulnerability.
This dirty bomb consisted of a deadly brew of dynamite and one of the
highly radioactive by-products of nuclear fission - Cesium 137. Extreme
versions of such gamma-ray emitting bombs, such as a dynamite-laden
casket of spent fuel from a nuclear power plant, would not kill quite as
many people as died on Sept. 11. worst-case calculation for an explosion
in downtown Manhattan during noontime: more than 2,000 deaths and many
thousands more suffering from radiation poisoning.
Treatment of those exposed would be greatly hampered by inadequate
medical facilities and training. The United States has only a single
hospital emergency room dedicated to treating patients exposed to
radiation hazards, at Oak Ridge, Tenn. A credible threat to explode such
a bomb in a U.S. city could have a powerful impact on the conduct of
U.S. foreign and military policy, and could possibly have a paralyzing
effect. Not only would the potential loss of life be considerable, but
also the prospect of mass evacuation of dense urban centers would loom
large in the minds of policy-makers.
The threat from radiological dispersion dims in comparison to the
possibility that terrorists could build or obtain an actual atomic bomb.
An explosion of even low yield could kill hundreds of thousands of
people. A relatively small bomb, say 15-kilotons, detonated in Manhattan
could immediately kill upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, followed by a
comparable number of deaths in the lingering aftermath. Fortunately,
bomb-grade nuclear fissile material (highly enriched uranium or
plutonium) is relatively heavily guarded in most, if not all, nuclear
weapon states.
Nonetheless, the possibility of diversion remains. Massive quantities of
fissile material exist around the world. Sophisticated terrorists could
fairly readily design and fabricate a workable atomic bomb once they
manage to acquire the precious deadly ingredients (the Hiroshima bomb
which used a simple gun-barrel design is the prime example).
Obviously, intelligence that helps localize the bomb is the main key to
success. Just as obviously, intelligence of such quality is seldom
available - as proven on Sept. 11. Such a search could be truly looking
for a needle in a haystack, as detection normally would succeed only if
the detectors come within a few feet or so of the hidden bomb. Disabling
a bomb is easy by comparison.
A radiological bomb might be surrounded by a tent enclosure several tens
of feet in height and width, then filled with a special foam to contain
the deadly radioactive material (such as Cesium 137) if the bomb
explodes during further defusing attempts.
For a nuclear device there are available a set of options for disabling
the weapon, including using explosives to wreck the bomb's wiring to
prevent the triggering of the nuclear detonators. Because of the
difficulty inherent in finding a nuclear weapon once it entered the
country, near-term U.S. response efforts would be best focused on
prevention and intervention to secure possible sources of nuclear
terrorism.
The most accessible nuclear device for any terrorist would be a
radiological dispersion bomb. This so-called 'dirty bomb' would consist
of waste by-products from nuclear reactors wrapped in conventional
explosives, which upon detonation would spew deadly radioactive
particles into the environment. This is an expedient weapon, in that
radioactive waste material is relatively easy to obtain. Radioactive
waste is widely found throughout the world, and in general is not as
well guarded as actual nuclear weapons. In the United States,
radioactive waste is located at more than 70 commercial nuclear power
sites in 31 states. Enormous quantities also exist overseas - in Europe
and Japan in particular. Tons of wastes are transported long distances,
including between continents (Japan to Europe and back). Cuba, since
1988 has two experimental nuclear reactors in La Habana. Very low power.
One is a 10 Watts. The other is referred to as zero Watts. They are used
for nuclear medicine and research on nuclear biotechnology. But they do
generate nuclear waste.
In Russia, security for nuclear waste is especially poor, and the
potential for diversion and actual use by Islamic radicals has been
shown to be very real indeed. In 1996, Islamic rebels from the
break-away province of Chechnya planted, but did not detonate, such a
device in Moscow's Izmailovo park to demonstrate Russia's vulnerability.
This dirty bomb consisted of a deadly brew of dynamite and one of the
highly radioactive by-products of nuclear fission - Cesium 137. Extreme
versions of such gamma-ray emitting bombs, such as a dynamite-laden
casket of spent fuel from a nuclear power plant, would not kill quite as
many people as died on Sept. 11. worst-case calculation for an explosion
in downtown Manhattan during noontime: more than 2,000 deaths and many
thousands more suffering from radiation poisoning.
Treatment of those exposed would be greatly hampered by inadequate
medical facilities and training. The United States has only a single
hospital emergency room dedicated to treating patients exposed to
radiation hazards, at Oak Ridge, Tenn. A credible threat to explode such
a bomb in a U.S. city could have a powerful impact on the conduct of
U.S. foreign and military policy, and could possibly have a paralyzing
effect. Not only would the potential loss of life be considerable, but
also the prospect of mass evacuation of dense urban centers would loom
large in the minds of policy-makers.
The threat from radiological dispersion dims in comparison to the
possibility that terrorists could build or obtain an actual atomic bomb.
An explosion of even low yield could kill hundreds of thousands of
people. A relatively small bomb, say 15-kilotons, detonated in Manhattan
could immediately kill upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, followed by a
comparable number of deaths in the lingering aftermath. Fortunately,
bomb-grade nuclear fissile material (highly enriched uranium or
plutonium) is relatively heavily guarded in most, if not all, nuclear
weapon states.
Nonetheless, the possibility of diversion remains. Massive quantities of
fissile material exist around the world. Sophisticated terrorists could
fairly readily design and fabricate a workable atomic bomb once they
manage to acquire the precious deadly ingredients (the Hiroshima bomb
which used a simple gun-barrel design is the prime example).
Obviously, intelligence that helps localize the bomb is the main key to
success. Just as obviously, intelligence of such quality is seldom
available - as proven on Sept. 11. Such a search could be truly looking
for a needle in a haystack, as detection normally would succeed only if
the detectors come within a few feet or so of the hidden bomb. Disabling
a bomb is easy by comparison. A radiological bomb might be surrounded by
a tent enclosure several tens of feet in height and width, then filled
with a special foam to contain the deadly radioactive material (such as
Cesium 137) if the bomb explodes during further defusing attempts.
For a nuclear device, a set of options for disabling the weapon are
available, including using explosives to wreck the bomb's wiring to
prevent the triggering of the nuclear detonators. Because of the
difficulty inherent in finding a nuclear weapon once it entered the
country, near-term U.S. response efforts would be best focused on
prevention and intervention to secure possible sources of nuclear
terrorism.
The damage caused by a dirty bomb depends on the amount of radioactive
and conventional explosive material in the bomb, as well as such factors
as wind, the size of the buildings in the area attacked, and the
ballistic at detonation. People in the immediate vicinity would likely
die from the force of the conventional explosion itself. Some survivors
of the blast might die of radiation poisoning in the weeks afterwards.
Those farther away from the explosion might suffer radiation sickness in
the weeks afterward but recover. Over time, risks of cancer in the
affected area would rise. The attack area could be not usable again, or
it may require months of intense cleanup efforts, somewhat like the
fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building after the anthrax letters
attacks.
Background
Materials are radioactive if their atomic nuclei, or centers,
spontaneously disintegrate, or decay, with high-energy fragments of this
disintegration flying off into the environment. Several kinds of
particles can so be emitted, and are collectively referred to as
radiation. The radiation produced by radioactive materials provides a
low-cost way to disinfect food , sterilize medical equipment, treat
certain kinds of cancer, find oil, build sensitive smoke detectors,
generate electricity, etc. As a result, significant amounts of
radioactive materials are stored in laboratories, food irradiation
plants, oil drilling facilities, nuclear plants, medical centers,
experimental reactors, and many other sites.
Sample cases
We will briefly refer to three cases to illustrate the range of impacts
that could be created by malicious use of comparatively small
radioactive sources: the amount of cesium that was discovered recently
abandoned in North Carolina, the amount of cobalt commonly found in a
single rod in a food irradiation facility, and the amount of americium
typically found in oil well logging systems. In all cases we will assume
that the material is released on a calm day. We assume that the material
is distributed by an explosion that causes a mist of fine particles to
spread downwind in a cloud. People will be exposed to radiation in
several ways.
· First, they will be exposed to material in the dust inhaled during the
initial passage of radiation cloud. We assume that at least 25% of the
material is in particles small enough to be inhaled. The material will
stay in the body and lead to a long term exposure.
· Second, anyone living in the affected area will be exposed to material
deposited from the dust that settles from the cloud. They will be
continuosly exposed to radiation from this dust, since the gamma rays
penetrate clothing and skin.
· People would also be exposed to radiation from contaminated food and
water sources.
Makings of a dirty bomb Hundreds of small radioactive power generators
are scattered across the former Soviet Union, and several other
countries. These lethal devices can be used as possible components in a
weapon to be used in a terrorist
asymmetric strike. Radio-thermal generators, RTGs, used by the Soviets
to power navigational beacons and communications equipment in remote
areas, each containing up to 40,000 curies of highly radioactive
strontium or cesium. Even a tiny fraction of a single curie of strontium
has a high probability of causing a fatal cancer. These two materials,
which cannot be used to make nuclear weapons, can be combined with
conventional explosives to build a dirty bomb or radiological bomb.
There are literally hundred of places, and countries, where terrorists
use and have access to materials for such a bomb, including dumping
grounds for medical waste. In some RTGs, the device's core typically is
a flash light-size capsule of strontium 90, surrounded by thick lead to
absorb the radiation. If broken, it radiates fatal doses of radiation
Conclusion
The events of September 11 have created a need to very carefully assess
our defense needs and ensure that the resources we spend for security
are aligned with the most pressing security threats. The threat of
malicious radiological attacks in the US is quite real, quite serious,
and deserves a vigorous response. There is no immediate way for the
public to distinguish a dirty bomb explosion from a regular explosion.
All nations classified as terrorist nations, have access to these
materials, and certainly most of them, including Cuba, have the
technology and capacity to build dirty bombs. Cuba has had nuclear
medicine for years, two experimental nuclear reactors given by the
Soviet Union, and access to materials such as cobalt, cesium, strontium,
iridium, and americium.
A state sponsor of terrorism would simply give the spent fuel or perhaps
even an entire dispersion device to terrorist groups. We must be on the
alert, and start thinking from the terrorist's perspective of maximizing
the destruction.
Again: Cuba is the common denominator, the intelligence provider, and
the facilitator, for the major terrorist activities. |
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INFOCUBA
