|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
NORTH KOREA AND CUBA
MANUEL CEREIJO
Biological Weapons Program
North Korea continues to have the scientists and facilities for
producing biological products and microorganisms. The North has the
ability to produce traditional infectious biological warfare agents or
toxins and biological weapons. Acting on orders of Kim Il-sung, in
November 1980 North Korea accelerated the development of biological
weapons, organizing research institutions and plants with specialists
from other countries. North Korea has been pursuing research and
development related to biological warfare since the 1960s. Pyongyang’s
resources presently include a rudimentary (by Western standards)
biotechnology infrastructure that is sufficient to support the
production of limited quantities of toxins, as well as viral and
bacterial biological warfare agents. In the early 1990s, an open press
release by a foreign government referred to applied military
biotechnology work at numerous North Korean medical institutes and
universities dealing with pathogens such as anthrax, cholera, and
plague. North Korea possesses a sufficient munitions-production
infrastructure to accomplish weaponization of BW agents. North Korea
acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987. Biological
warfare has not received the same attention as chemical or nuclear
warfare. This could be because North Korea lacks the technical expertise
or because the difficulty in controlling biological warfare makes it a
less desirable option. North Korea realizes that biological weapons are
as dangerous to its own forces as they are to South Korean or US forces,
and the North's limited medical services would make the agents more
lethal. Therefore, using biological agents is not a likely option.
However, if North Korea did choose to employ biological weapons, it
probably could use agents like anthrax, plague, or yellow fever against
water and food supplies in the South's rear area.
The work done at the National Defense Research Institute and Medical
Academy (NDRIMA) included studies of disease pathogens such as anthrax,
cholera, bubonic plague, smallpox, yellow fever and others. Since early
1990s, North Korea and Cuba have maintained a secret, but constant
exchange of scientists and technology.
Chemical Weapons Program
In 1954 the Soviet Union and China transferred certain special
technologies as well as chemical agents and means of protection against
them captured from the
Japanese and Kuomintang during World War II to the Korean People's Army
[KPA].
The next five years were marked by the swift development of the DPRK
chemical industry. Despite the fact that the country possessed
considerable deposits of natural raw materials, it proved to be a rather
difficult task to create domestic capacities for producing chemical
weapons. In 1964 the DPRK concluded a contract with Japan for deliveries
of agricultural chemicals. Under their guise, components came into the
country initially for synthesis of tabun and mustard gas, and a later
chlorine and phosphorus-containing organic compounds were imported.
North Korea’s chemical warfare program is believed to be mature and
includes the capability, since 1989, to indigenously produce bulk
quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents as well
as a variety of different filled munitions systems. North Korea is
believed to possess a sizable stockpile of chemical weapons, which could
be employed in offensive military operations against the South. North
Korea has also devoted considerable scarce resources to defensive
measures aimed at protecting its civilian population and military forces
from the effects of chemical weapons. Such measures include extensive
training in the use of protective masks, suits, detectors, and
decontamination
systems. Though these measures are ostensibly focused on a perceived
threat from U.S. and South Korean forces, they could also support the
offensive use of
chemical weapons by the North during combat. North Korea has yet to sign
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is not expected to do so in
the near-term,
due to intrusive inspection and verification requirements mandated by
the agreement.
North Korea maintains a number of facilities involved in producing or
storing chemical precursors, agents, and weapons. North Korea has at
least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents;
however, the production rate and types of munitions are uncertain.
Presumably, sarin, tabun, phosgene, adamsite, prussic acid and a family
of mustard gases, comprising the basis of KPA chemical weapons, are
produced here. North Korea has the capability to produce nerve gas,
blood agents, and the mustard-gas family of chemical weapons.
North Korea and Cuba started cooperation in this field in the 1970s,
while Cuba was involved in the wars in Africa.
In the assessment of US intelligence services, their reserves,
accommodated in perhaps half a dozen major storage sites and as many as
170 mountain tunnels, are at least 180 to 250 tons, with some estimates
of chemical stockpiles run as high as 5,000 tons. In May 1996 ROK
Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha reported to the
National Assembly that it was estimated that North Korea possessed
approximately 5,000 ton of biological and chemical weapons. Given the
extensive production
facilities, this later estimate may constitute the low end of the actual
stockpile.
North Korea is capable of producing and employing chemical weapons that
virtually all the fire support systems in its inventory could deliver,
including most of its artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers
(including those mounted on CHAHO-type boats), and mortars. Some bombs
the Air Force employs also could deliver chemical agents, as could the
FROG or the SCUD missile.
Chemicals could increase the impact of a surprise attack. If the North
should use this option, it would have an advantage over forward-deployed
South Korean and US forces. Nonpersistent chemical agents also could be
used to break through defensive lines or hinder a South Korean
counterattack's momentum. Persistent chemical agents could be used
against fixed targets in the rear areas, such as command and control
elements, major lines of communications, or logistic depots.
Not only do these weapons enhance North Korea's offensive capabilities,
but this chemical capability could deter South Korea or the United
States from using chemicals during hostilities. In any attack on the
South, Pyongyang could use chemical weapons to attack forces deployed
near the DMZ, suppress allied airpower, and isolate the peninsula from
strategic reinforcement.
North Korean military units conduct regular NBC defensive training
exercises in preparation for operations in a chemical environment. North
Korea has chemical
defense units at all levels of its force structure. These units are
equipped with decontamination and detection equipment. North Korean
military personnel have access to individual protective masks and
protective suits.
Since 1990, Pyongyang has placed high priority on military and civilian
chemical defense readiness. It has mandated operational training in
chemical environments as an integral part of armed forces training and
is trying to equip all military forces, including reserves, with full
protective gear. In addition, the leadership has required broad segments
of the population to engage periodically in simulated chemical warfare
drills. Pyongyang has emphasized building and installing collective
protection equipment at military production and civilian alternate
wartime relocation sites, directing that the entire population be issued
protective masks.
Command and Control
North Korea's military command, control, and communications system
consists of extensive hardened wartime command facilities, supported by
redundant communication systems, which are believed to be largely
separate from systems supporting other sectors. A modernized
telecommunications infrastructure will greatly increase the regime's
ability to perform both peacetime and wartime management tasks, and as
in any country, could provide critical backup for military communication
systems if necessary. There are over 30 villas for Kim Jong-Il scattered
at mountains and beaches of superb scenic beauty, known as "palaces." It
was Kim Il-sung who began building villas at places of scenic beauty.
Those built in the '50s and '60s were exclusively for Kim Il-sung. In
the '70s, when Kim Jong-il began emerging as his successor, villas
started being built exclusively for Kim Jong-il. Since the death of Kim
Il-sung in '94, both Kim Il-sung villas and Kim Jong-il villas have been
used exclusively as Kim Jong-il "palaces." Facilities are impressive and
include banquet halls, fishing sites, horse-riding grounds and hunting
sites, on areas as large as many Western estates. Thousands of resident
personnel are charged with their management and upkeep. It is estimated
that more than US$2.5 billion was spent for the construction of the
aforementioned facilities.
"Kangdong Palace" and "Dukchun Palace" were built in the suburbs of
Pyongyang after the death of Kim Il-sung, at a cost of over US$150
million. Kim Jong-Il spends about 10 days or more at the palaces in an
average month. He uses them for rest with his family and enjoying
luxurious parties with his close officials, and sometimes uses them as
his office when conducting inspections of military units or industrial
sites. North Korea currently is modernizing its aged telecommunications
infrastructure to improve the speed and quality and expand the capacity
of both domestic and international communications.
A fiber-optic cable linking Pyongyang and Hamhung was complete by early
1995, with construction from Pyongyang to Kangwon, North Hamgyong, and
South Pyongan Provinces almost complete by midyear. In 1995, North Korea
acquired digital Chinese switching equipment for Chongjin, Najin, and
Hamhung. Large quantities of new and used telephones from a number of
countries increased the number of telephones to 3.7 per 100 persons by
1993.
The current emphasis in the modernization program is on upgrading
communications supporting the Najin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone in northeast
North Korea. A large communications center at Najin will be the focal
point; it will be equipped with digital switching and other modern
equipment and will offer modern communication services to businesses
operating in the zone. Vastly improved communications between the Free
Trade Zone and other countries will include fiber-optic cable and a
digital microwave relay link between Pyongyang, Najin, and Vladivostok,
with a shorter link between Najin and Hunchun, China. Additional plans
for the Free Trade Zone include construction of a satellite earth
station, as well as communication center branches, in the zone.
North Korean military personnel have been receiving training at the
Bejucal electronic base in Cuba, since 1999.
Nuclear Weapons Program
Current Status
In early October of 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelley
informed North Korean officials that the United States was aware that
North Korea had a program underway to enrich uranium for use in nuclear
weapons. Initially North Korea denied this, but later confirmed the
veracity of the US claim. In confirming that they had an active nuclear
weapons program, they also declared the Agreed Framework nullified.
The Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea on
October 21, 1994 in Geneva agreed that:
· North Korea would freeze its existing nuclear program and agree to
enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
· Both sides would cooperate to replace the D.P.R.K.'s
graphite-moderated reactors for related facilities with light-water
(LWR) power plants.
· Both countries would move toward full normalization of political and
economic relations.
· Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula.
· And that both sides would work to strengthen the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
Prior to the establishment of the Agreed Framework, intelligence sources
believe that North Korea could have extracted plutonium from their
reactors for use in nuclear weapons-perhaps enough for one or two
nuclear weapons. Aluminum rods, necessary for the enrichment of uranium,
according to some intelligence sources, have been provided by Planta
Mecanica, in Cuba.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether it has actually produced or
possesses nuclear weapons due to difficulties in developing detonation
devices.
History
North Korea maintains uranium mines with four million tons of
exploitable high-quality uranium. In the mid-1960s, it established a
large-scale atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon and trained
specialists from students who had studied in the Soviet Union. Under the
cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear
research center was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965
a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From
1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was
supplied to the DPRK for this reactor.
In the 1970s it focused study on the nuclear fuel cycle including
refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974 Korean specialists
independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way
that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been
modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to
fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment
was reduced. In the same period the DPRK began to build a 5 MWe research
reactor, what is called the "second reactor." In 1977 the DPRK concluded
an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA],
allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with
the assistance of the USSR.
The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1980s. In the
1980s, focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion
of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea began to operate
facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion. It began construction
of a 200 MWe nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities in
Taechon and Yongbyon, respectively, and conducted high-explosive
detonation tests. In 1985 US officials announced for the first time that
they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was
being built 90 km north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon.
The installation at Yongbyon had been known for eight years from
official IAEA reports. In 1985, under international pressure, Pyongyang
acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
However, the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In July 1990 The Washington Post reported that new satellite photographs
showed the presence in Yongbyon of a structure which could possibly be
used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel.
In a major initiative in July 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo
called for new efforts to promote North-South exchanges, family
reunification, inter-Korean trade, and contact in international forums.
Roh followed up this initiative in a UN General Assembly speech in which
South Korea offered for the first time to discuss security matters with
the North. Initial meetings that grew out of Roh's proposals started in
September 1989. In September 1990, the first of eight prime
minister-level meetings between North Korean and South Korean officials
took place in Seoul, beginning an especially fruitful period of
dialogue. The prime ministerial talks resulted in two major agreements:
the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and
Cooperation (the "basic agreement") and the Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (the "joint declaration").
In late 1991 North and South Korea signed the Agreement on
Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Joint
Declaration called for a bilateral nuclear inspection regime to verify
the denuclearization of the peninsula. The Declaration, which came into
force on 19 February 1992, states that the two sides "shallnot test,
manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deployor use nuclear
weapons," and that they "shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and
uranium enrichment facilities." A procedure for inter-Korean inspection
was to be organized and a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission
(JNCC) was mandated with verification of the denuclearization of the
peninsula.
On 30 January 1992 the DPRK also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement
with the IAEA, as it had pledged to do in 1985 when acceding to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This safeguards agreement allowed IAEA
inspections to begin in June 1992. In March 1992, the JNCC was
established in accordance with the joint declaration, but subsequent
meetings failed to reach agreement on the main issue of establishing a
bilateral inspection regime.
When North Korean Deputy Prime Minister Kim Tal-Hyon visited South Korea
for economic talks in July 1992, President Roh Tae Woo announced that
full North-South Economic Cooperation would not be possible without
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. There was little progress
toward the establishment of an inspection regime, and dialogue between
the South and North stalled in the fall of 1992.
The North's agreement to accept IAEA safeguards initiated a series of
IAEA inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. This promising
development was halted by the North's refusal in January 1993 to allow
special inspections of two unreported facilities suspected of holding
nuclear waste. Ignoring the South-North Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea refused IAEA
inspections and operated nuclear reprocessing facilities, making the
world suspicious of its nuclear intentions.
Lack of progress on implementation of the denuclearization accord
triggered actions on both sides that led to North Korea's March 12,
1993, announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). The North's threat to withdraw from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) brought North-South progress to an abrupt
halt. Tensions ran high on the Korean Peninsula as the confrontation
between North Korea and the United States deepened.
The UN Security Council on 11 May 1993 passed a resolution urging the
DPRK to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
to implement the 1991 North-South denuclearization accord. It also urged
all member states to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to this
resolution and to facilitate a solution.
The US responded by holding political-level talks with the DPRK in early
June 1993 that led to a joint statement outlining the basic principles
for continued US-DPRK dialogue and North Korea's "suspending" its
withdrawal from the NPT. A second round of talks was held July 14-19,
1993, in Geneva. The talks set the guidelines for resolving the nuclear
issue, improving U.S.-North Korean relations, and restarting
inter-Korean talks, but further negotiations deadlocked.
Following the DPRK's spring 1994 unloading of fuel from its
five-megawatt nuclear reactor and the resultant US push for UN
sanctions, former President Carter's visit to Pyongyang in June 1994
helped to defuse tensions and resulted in renewed South-North talks. A
third round of talks between the US and the DPRK opened in Geneva on
July 8, 1994. However, the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Il
Sung on July 8, 1994 halted plans for a first ever South-North
presidential summit and led to another period of inter-Korean animosity.
The talks were recessed upon news of the death of North Korean President
Kim Il Sung, then resumed in August. These talks concluded with the
Agreed Framework.
Under the framework agreement, the North would freeze and eventually
dismantle its existing suspect nuclear program, including the 50 MW and
200 MW graphite-moderated reactors under construction, as well as its
existing 5 MW reactor and nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. In return,
Pyongyang would be provided with alternative energy, initially in the
form of heavy oil, and eventually two proliferation-resistant light
water reactors (LWR). The two 1,000 MW light-water nuclear reactors
would be safer and would produce much less plutonium, in order to help
boost the supply of electricity in the North, which is now in a critical
shortage. The agreement also included gradual improvement of relations
between the US and the DPRK, and committed North Korea to engage in
South-North dialogue.
A few weeks after the signing of the Agreed Framework, President Kim
loosened restrictions on South Korean firms desiring to pursue business
opportunities with the North. Although North Korea continued to refuse
official overtures by the South, economic contacts appeared to be
expanding gradually.
A close examination by the IAEA of the radioactive isotope content in
the nuclear waste revealed that North Korea had extracted about 24
kilograms of Plutonium. North Korea was supposed to have produced 0.9
gram of Plutonium per megawatt every day over a 4-year period from 1987
to 1991. The 0.9 gram per day multiplied by 365 days by 4 years and by
30 megawatts equals to 39 kilograms. When the yearly operation ratio is
presumed to be 60 percent, the actual amount was estimated at 60% of 39
kilograms, or some 23.4 kilograms. Since 20-kiloton standard nuclear
warhead has 8 kilograms of critical mass, this amounts to mass of
material of nuclear fission out of which about 3 nuclear warheads could
be extracted.
Estimates vary of both the amount of plutonium in North Korea's
possession and number of nuclear weapons that could be manufactured from
the material. South Korean, Japanese, and Russian intelligence estimates
of the amount of plutonium separated, for example, are reported to be
higher -- 7 to 22 kilograms, 16 to 24 kilograms, and 20 kilograms,
respectively -- than the reported US estimate of about 12 kilograms. At
least two of the estimates are said to be based on the assumption that
North Korea removed fuel rods from the 5-MW(e) reactor and subsequently
reprocessed the fuel during slowdowns in the reactor's operations in
1990 and 1991. The variations in the estimates about the number of
weapons that could be produced from the material depend on a variety of
factors, including assumptions about North Korea's reprocessing
capabilities -- advanced technology yields more material -- and the
amount of plutonium it takes to make a nuclear weapon. Until January
1994, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 8 kilograms would be
needed to make a small nuclear weapon. Thus, the United States' estimate
of 12 kilograms could result in one to two bombs. In January 1994,
however, DOE reduced the estimate of the amount of plutonium needed to 4
kilograms--enough to make up to three bombs if the US estimate is used
and up to six bombs if the other estimates are used.
On 22 April 1997, U.S. Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon
officially stated, "When the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement was
signed in Geneva in 1994, the U.S. intelligence authorities already
believed North Korea had produced plutonium enough for at least one
nuclear weapon." This was the first time the United States confirmed
North Korea's possession of plutonium.
In accordance with the terms of the 1994 framework, the US Government in
January 1995 responded to North Korea's decision to freeze its nuclear
program and cooperate with US and IAEA verification efforts by easing
economic sanctions against North Korea in four areas through:
· Authorizing transactions related to telecommunications connections,
credit card use for personal or travel-related transactions, and the
opening of journalists' offices;
· Authorizing D.P.R.K. use of the U.S. banking system to clear
transactions not originating or terminating in the United States and
unblocking frozen assets where there is no D.P.R.K. Government interest;
· Authorizing imports of magnesite, a refractory material used in the
U.S. steel industry--North Korea and China are the world's primary
sources of this raw material; and
· Authorizing transactions related to future establishment of liaison
offices, case-by-case participation of U.S. companies in the light water
reactor project, supply of alternative energy, and disposition of spent
nuclear fuel as provided for by the agreed framework, in a manner
consistent with applicable laws.
Smooth implementation of the 1994 agreed framework was obstructed for a
time by North Korea's refusal to accept South Korean-designed LWR model
reactors. US and DPRK negotiators met for three weeks in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, and on June 12, 1995, reached an accord resolving this issue.
North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) with respect to the model for the
LWRs and agreed that KEDO would select a prime contractor to carry out
the LWR project. The KEDO executive board announced that it had selected
the South Korean-designed Ulchin 3-4 LWR as the reference model for the
project and that a South Korean firm would be the prime contractor. The
South Korean prime contractor would be responsible for all aspects of
the LWR project including design, manufacture, construction, and
management. In this Kuala Lumpur accord to the 1994 Geneva agreed
framework, the DPRK also agreed to negotiate directly with KEDO on all
outstanding issues related to the LWR project. On December 15, 1995,
KEDO and the DPRK signed the Light Water Reactor Supply Agreement. KEDO
teams have also made a number of trips to North Korea to survey the
proposed reactor site; in the spring of 1996, KEDO and the DPRK began
negotiations on implementing protocols to the supply agreement.
Pyongyang is cooperating with Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization, whose leading members are South Korea, the United States
and Japan. KEDO has reached an agreement on the provision of the
light-water nuclear reactors by 2003, and, in return, North Korea has
frozen its nuclear program. South Korea, which has promised to bear the
lion's share of the reactor project cost estimated at US$4.5 billion, is
asking the United States to put up at least a symbolic amount. The US
administration, however, has said it can make no contribution to the
construction cost as Congress has not appropriated the necessary budget.
An official in Seoul, however, said that South Korea cannot drop its
demand simply because of domestic problems in the United States. The US
Congress has been delaying approval of the cost for the reactor project.
South Korean officials said the U.S. refusal to share the reactor cost
would make it difficult for them to obtain approval from the National
Assembly for the South Korean share.
Since the conclusion of the Supply Agreement in December 1995, six
related protocols have come into effect and three rounds of expert-level
negotiations have produced solid results. The ROK power company, Korea
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), is the prime contractor for this
project and has as its responsibility the design, manufacture,
procurement, construction and management of the reactors. On 19 August
1997 KEDO and North Korea held a groundbreaking ceremony to begin
construction of two light-water reactors.
In October 2002, North Korean officials acknowledged the existence of a
clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons that is in
violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements.
(Check out
Table #1
/
Tables #2)
NOTES:
SRBM - Short Range Ballistic Missile < 1,000 km
MRBM - Medium Range Ballistic Missile 1,000-2,500 km
IRBM - Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 2,500-3,500 km
LRICBM - Limited Range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 3,500-8,000 km
Many of the ranges suggested for the yet-to-fly missile systems are
based on mathematical models relying on what little data has been made
public. The large ranges suggested by some of these studies do not
necessarily imply likely ranges for an armed missile in the near future,
rather they often attempt to extrapolate a maximum possible range for a
given design, so as to come up with a worst-case scenario. |
|
|
|
|
|
INFOCUBA
