|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
NUCLEAR POWER: A SECOND LOOK
The last nuclear power plant built in the United States was ordered
in 1978, the year before the Three Mile Island accident stopped the
growth of the U.S. industry in its tracks.
However, the Bush administration’s energy plan, released in May
2003, stated that nuclear energy is an essential part of the
national energy mix, and directed the Department of Energy to
support the expansion of nuclear power generation in the United
States, as “a major component of national energy policy”.
Also, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission extended for 20 more
years six U.S. power plants’ operating licenses this year. Nuclear
engineering enrollments at Universities, long in decline, started to
climb.
It is time, clearly, to take a new look at nuclear power. The
technology itself is also changing. The next reactor built in the
States may be a pebble-bed reactor. Of course, economic analysis
will be critical in determining whether new nuclear plants are
built.
Waste disposal continues to be the major obstacle to the growth of
nuclear power. However, utilities finally have found a technique
that will let them seal the waste safely for decades. It takes years
to get a new reactor from the drawing board into operation. But, it
turns out, reactors appear to be more durable than originally
expected. So, instead of building new ones, nuclear plant operators
are applying for extensions in the licensed lifetime of old ones.
New and planned Nuclear Reactors in
the World* |
|
|
|
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
2016 |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
China |
2 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
20 |
|
North Korea |
|
1 |
1 |
|
5 |
7 |
|
Iran |
|
|
1 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
|
Russia |
2 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
12 |
|
| |
|
*We showed a break between 2005 and 2016
to simplify the data.
Nuclear energy is the world’s largest source of emission free energy.
The use of nuclear energy in place of other energy sources helps to keep
the air clean, preserve the earth’s climate, avoid ground-level ozone
formation, and prevent acid rain.
The “new” pebble-bed concept builds on the high temperature gas cooled
reactor technology developed in the 1960s. Typical of this technology is
the use of a helium coolant and a graphite moderator. The pebble bed’s
fuel takes very high temperatures and won’t break down.
The power industry will be looking at two approaches: extension time for
present operating nuclear power plants; building new, more high
technology power plants.
Cuba
The analysis takes us to Cuba’s nuclear activities.
Cuba: Electrical Energy
Up to 1959, Cuba was supplied of electrical energy by the following
major utilities:
(1) Compañia Cubana de Electricidad (CCE). CCE was a subsidiary of the
American and Foreign Power Company, previously part of the Electric Bond
and Share Co.-EBASCO. CCE’s service territory included the Eastern part
of Pinar del Rio province, La Habana, Matanzas, Las Villas, Camaguey,
and the Southern part of the Oriente province.
(2) Hernandez y Hermanos. Its service territory included the western
part of Pinar del Rio province and the cities of Trinidad, Casilda and
several towns in Las
Villas province.
(3) Tabares. Its service territory included the northern and central
part of the Pinar del Rio province
(4) Islas de Pinos utility. Covering Isla de Pinos
(5) Many other spotted areas were served by the large sugar mill
industry or the
larger industrial complexes in the Island.
All these utilities were franchised and regulated by the Public Service
Commission, under the Ministry of Communications. Presently, all
electric generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy
in Cuba is controlled by the government through the entity Empresa
Electrica Cubana, under the Ministry of Basic Industries. There are no
private electric utility companies in Cuba.
Cuba has an installed generating capacity of 3,500 megawatts. However,
the net generating capacity is only 1,200 megawatts. The industry
employs some 29,000 workers, of which, 4000 are technicians, and 850 are
engineers. The electrical energy demand was in 1996 of 2,500 megawatts,
distributed as follows:
*50% industrial
*4% agricultural
*12% commercial
*34% residential
The rest is for miscellaneous loads. However, in 2002 the demand
diminished to 950 megawatts, mainly due to the large decrease in the
industrial and residential loads.
The composition of the main units, equipment, instruments, and
components is very diverse. The main suppliers are: United States (pre
Castro), former Soviet Union, Japan, Italy, France, Czech Republic,
Germany. The main generating plants are:
(1) Mariel, capacity 600 megawatts
(2) Tallapiedra, capacity 200 megawatts
(3) Regla, capacity 200 megawatts
(4) Santa Cruz del Norte, capacity 300 megawatts
(5) Antonio Guiteras, capacity 350 megawatts
(6) Cienfuegos, capacity 400 megawatts
(7) Felton, capacity 250 megawatts
(8) Nuevitas, capacity 200 megawatts
(9) Rente, capacity 300 megawatts
(10) Hanabanilla, ( Hydroelectric), capacity 45 megawatts.
There are a total of 46 operating units located in 20 different sites.
The transmission voltage is 110 kV and 220 kV. The country is mainly
interconnected with a 220kV grid. Transmission conductors are ACSR
150mm. Transmission structures are concrete, metal, and H frame made of
wood. Distribution voltages are 4.16 kV and 13.8 kV, and the system
operates at 60 Hz. Distribution conductors are 150 mm, 70 mm, and 35 mm
ACSR. Almost all distribution is overhead, except some underground in La
Habana.
Approximately 95% of the generating units in Cuba use No. 6 fuel oil. A
4% use No. 2 fuel oil. Due to the wide range of unit ages and country of
origin present in the system, the sizes and operating parameters are
very diverse. The age range of the units vary from 10 years, the newest
one installed in Felton, to over 45 years for the ones present in Cuba
before 1959. Usually accepted economical and technical life for steam
generating units is 30 t0 35 years. An estimated 45% of the units
installed in Cuba are small, inefficient, and over the accepted range of
operating life.
Cuba consumed 13 million tons of oil in 1989, of which, 7 million tons,
or 40 million barrels were for the generation of electricity. In 2002,
Cuba consumed, for all needs, 6.3 million tons of oil. Of these,
approximately 1.2 millions were domestic oil . Domestic oil is not
suitable as a fuel for the generating units because of the high content
of sulphur, 9%, which if used in the boilers, creates sulphuric acid,
which corrodes the boilers.
The percentage of Cuba’s oil consumption is as follows:
· 50% imported crude oil
· 35% imported, refined
· 15% domestic production crude oil.
Cuba’s domestic oil reserves are scant, so increasing domestic
production is not feasible.
Cuba has presently an installed capacity of 290 watts per person.
However, it has a net generating capacity of 100 watts per person. It is
estimated that a country, in order to sustain a stable economic and
industrial growth should have available at least 600 watts per person of
net generating capacity.
The most prevalent problems with the electrical energy system in Cuba
are:
(1) insufficient net generating capacity
(2) dependence on imported oil as fuel
(3) lack of reliability
(4) inefficiency of the system
(5) poor condition of the transmission and distribution system.
JURAGUA
As seen above, over the past 20 years Cuba has been faced with an
ongoing energy crisis. Depending heavily upon imported oil, the Cuban
government has attempted to seek an alternative to oil through nuclear
energy. In cooperation with the former Soviet Union, Cuba embarked on a
project to construct and operate a nuclear power plant in Cienfuegos,
known as Juragua. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union halted
construction at Juragua. Recent bilateral cooperation between Cuba and
Russia has re-ignited the possibility of Juragua’s completion in the
near future. The United States views a nuclear reactor in Cuba as a
threat to its national security. The U.S. has cited numerous safety
concerns associated with Juragua, believing in the event of an accident
it would be exposed to radioactive fallout.
Description
In 1976 Cuba and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to construct two
440-megawatt nuclear power reactors in the south central province of
Cienfuegos, near Juragua, about 180 south of Key West, Florida.
Juragua’s nuclear reactors are of the model VVER-440, of Soviet design
and are the first Soviet-designed reactors to be built in the Western
Hemisphere in a tropical environment.
The arrangement was aimed at alleviating Cuba’s dependency upon foreign
oil while bolstering its electricity capacity. The importation of oil
has drained Cuba of its sparse hard currency. At the same time the
country’s production of electricity has been fraught with difficulties.
As of 1992 Cuban power plants have been working at only 47% of their
capacity, leading to frequent blackouts. This figure has fallen further
due to the relative decline in the Cuban economy since 1998. Upon
completion, the first reactor, Juragua #1, would generate approximately
15% of Cuba’s energy demands. Figure #s 4 and 5 show construction site
of Juragua at two different years.
Actual construction of the reactors began in 1983. The Soviet Union
supplied a majority of the reactor parts, dispatched technicians to
supervise construction, and trained Cuban engineers to operate the
reactors. According to 1992 GAO report, Russia tentatively scheduled the
first reactor to be operational in late 1995. This was due in part to
the Cubans constructing the reactor lacking experience and with all
critical work being performed by Russians or under their supervision.
However, the breakup of the Soviet Union disrupted construction at
Juragua. The newly formed Russian Federation in conjunction with its
transitioning into a market economy established new economic ties with
Cuba. Current bilateral ties between Russia and Cuba, now, involve
providing technical assistance to Cuba on a commercial basis.
At the same time the loss of Soviet subsidies to Cuba after 1990 has
sent the Cuban economy into decline. As a result, on September 5, 1992,
Cuba announced a suspension of construction at Juragua due to Cuba’s
inability to meet the financial terms set by Russia to complete the
reactors.
A September 1992 GAO report estimated that civil construction on the
first reactor ranged from 90% to 97% complete with only 37% of the
reactor equipment installed. About 25% of the civil construction on the
second reactor was completed with the status of the equipment unknown.
Cuban-Russian attempts to resume construction at Juragua took place in
October 1995. A high-level Russian delegation with full backing of the
government arrived in La Habana to conclude an agreement to complete
construction. To raise the $ 800 million dollars necessary to complete
the reactors, Russia and Cuba decided to form a syndicate with potential
third parties. Companies in Britain, Brazil, Italy, Germany, Spain, and
Russia expressed interest in an economic association.
However, nothing concrete came out at that time. Cuba was rewarded with
a $50 million dollar grant loan from Russia for support work at Juragua.
Cuba now receives financial support for the Juragua plant from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The AIEA has provided nuclear
technical assistance in atomic energy development and in the application
of isotopes and radiation.
The AIEA has provided from 1991 to 1996 about $1 million to Cuba to
develop the ability to conduct a safety assessment of Juragua reactors,
and in preserving or “mothballing”the reactors while construction is
suspended. This assistance increased during 1997 to 1999. It is
estimated that through the last 20 years the IAEA has provided Cuba with
some $14 million dollars.
Recent events have lead to the speculation of resumption of construction
in the near future. Recently, July 2000, an official from the Russian
Federation announced the intention to resume construction of Juragua.
This will be accomplished through an international consortium of
countries, including Russia. Upon resumption of construction, the
Juragua first reactor is expected to be operational within a 14 month
time-span.
The terrorist attack of 9/11 brought to a halt all activities related to
resume construction of Juragua. Hovever, since mid 2002, Cuba has been
strongly looking for starting the reconstruction of Juragua, having
conversations with private firms from Spain, Russia, and with countries
like China, Brazil, and Iran.
The main problem is the Cuban economy. That is, the customers of the
Juragua power plant will be the Cuban people, paying in pesos. The peso
has no value at all in the international market. Therefore, there is a
degree of difficulty in finding the appropriate investors willing to
risk their money in such a risk. Therefore, if Cuba finds finally a
group of investors, they will be more politically motivated than
financially motivated. However, in today’s world, after 9/11, the
possibilities of finding a terrorist country, directly or
indirectly-through a third group-willing to invest in Juragua, have
increased compared to pre 9/11.
VVER-440 reactors
A VVER-440 reactor is a pressurized water reactor developed from a
reactor design based on the first nuclear submarine reactors in the
Soviet Union, where de-mineralized light water is applied as both
cooling agent and for moderating the neutrons. The first version,
VVER-440/230, was developed in the 60’s, while the VVER-440/213 was
introduced in the 80’s. It is a Russian version of the Pressurized Water
reactor (PWR). There are three standard designs-two 6 loop-440
megawatt(the 230 and 213 models), and 4 loop-1000megawatt output
designs. Re-fuelings are conducted with the plant shutdown.
The reactor core in a VVER-440 reactor is 3 meters in diameter, has a
height of 2.5 meters, and is enclosed by a cylindrical pressure
receptacle of steel, of a diameter of 4.3 meters and a height of 11.8
meters. The total weight is 200 tons. The reactor core contains 312 fuel
assemblies and 37 control assemblies. Each fuel assembly consists of 126
fuel pins, which in turn consists of uranium-dioxide pellets. The
content of 235U in the fuel is replaced by new, non-irradiated fuel
assemblies. The temperature of the cooling water as it leaves the
reactor is between 295 and 300 degrees Celsius.
Each reactor coolant loop includes a steam generator and a reactor
coolant pump. The water passes through the inside of the tubes in the
steam generator. The reactor coolant pump circulates the water for
cooling the reactor core. The system is pressurized to 2200+ pounds per
square inch by a pressurizer, which is connected to one of the reactor
coolant loops.
A major difference between western designed PWRs and the VVERs is that
the latter have horizontal steam generators. The older VVERs have
isolation valves in the reactor coolant loops and accident localization
compartments. Water passing on the outside of the steam generator tubes
is heated and converted to steam. Steam in the VVER design is not
expected to be radioactive. The VVER 440 design includes accident
localization zones and a confinement rather than a true containment.
The VVER-440 in Juragua belong to the “second generation” of the VVER
family. However, they do not meet western standards. They also have an
inadequacy of the upper portion of the reactor’s dome retention
capability to withstand only 7 pounds of pressure per square inch, given
that normal atmospheric pressure is 32 pounds per square inch and United
States reactors are designed to accommodate pressures of 50 pounds per
square inch. Normal air pressure at sea level, the level at which the
plant is being constructed, is 14.7 pounds per square inch. Therefore,
the dome cannot survive when exposed to the atmosphere.
The design of the Cuban reactor has many features in common with those
of the U.S., but there are several differences that could lead to
significantly different reactions in the event of a serious accident.
For example, while the Cuban reactor, like the U.S. PWRs, use water to
cool the reactor core, the Cuban reactor uses a different system for
handling the steam pressure that would be generated by a severe
accident.
In the Cuban reactor, the steam is condensed so that pressure is reduced
in the containment structure. If, in the case of a severe accident, the
system for condensing the steam is bypassed and the steam reaches the
upper portion of the containment in pressures greater than the upper
portion’s designed pressure retention capability of 7 pounds per square
inch. The containment could be breached and a radioactive release could
occur. In contrast, U.S. PWRs are designed to accommodate pressures of
about 50 pounds per square inch throughout the containment structure.
Another main difference between the VVER-440 reactors and reactors of
Western type is the degree of safety containment surrounding the reactor
tank of the VVER-440.The airtight safety containment of Western power
plant encloses the reactor tank, the primary-and secondary circuits, as
well as the steam generators. At a possible leakage, the safety
containments will see that the radioactive steam does not escape to the
surroundings. At Western reactors, this safety containment is made of
pre-stressed concrete.
Also, there are devices for cooling the steam to decrease the pressure.
The construction surrounding the reactor systems of the VVER-440 has a
volume too small to relieve the pressure arising should a breach occur
in pipes of more than 32 mm in diameter. The construction is fitted with
valves, which are released if the pressure gets too high.
Integral reactor systems, including the reactor vessel itself, six steam
generators, five primary coolant pumps, twelve isolation valves and
more, were stored outside for months, exposed to the highly corrosive
tropical sea air and weather. No nuclear reactor of Soviet design has
ever been constructed in a tropical climate.
The group of the world’s seven richest countries (G7) has concluded that
all reactors of the VVER-440 type must be shut down as soon possible, as
the reactors are upgraded to Western safety standards. Even the World
Bank emphasizes the serious defects of reactors of this type, rendering
any reconstruction unprofitable. From an economical point of view, the
World Bank claims nuclear power plant with reactors of the VVER-440 type
to be the most expensive energy alternative for the years to come.
There are eight VVER-440 reactors in operation in former Eastern Europe
and Russia. Six additional reactors of this type have formerly been in
operation, but are now shut down. Four reactors were in operation at the
nuclear power plant of Greifswald in former DDR. The reactors were
dismantled by the German authorities after the reunion due to the lack
of security at this type of reactor. There are two reactors in Armenia,
but they are temporarily shut down due to their poor state.
On the construction side, the VVER-440 reactors deviate from safety
standards of Western reactors. IEAA performed in 1991 a safety analysis
of the 10 reactors in operation, and found 100 safety aspects connected
to the design and the operation of the plants. More than 60% of these
aspects are of great importance when safety is concerned.
The main problems concerning the design of the reactor type is as
following:
· Deficiencies in the construction concerning the limitation of
discharges to the surroundings in case of breaches in pipes of more than
32 mm in the primary circuit
· Lack of safety containment surrounding the core
· Limited capacity of the cooling system
· Insufficient “backup” of the cooling system and safety system
· Lack of distinction between control systems and safety precautions
concerning fire
· Obsolete control room technology
Neutron irradiation of the reactor tank, causing the steel to become
brittle, is a vital safety issue of the VVER-440 reactors. The proximity
of the fuel assemblies to the steel walls in the VVER-440 reactor tank,
causes higher neutron irradiation than in other types of reactors, and
the walls to become brittle at a higher pace than normal. The VVER-440
reactor tank is made up of welded rings. The welded seams are
particularly exposed to neutron irradiation. As a remedy, in some
designs during the late 80’s, the outermost assemblies were replaced
with steel rods.
Light-water reactors are considered safer than the graphite-cooled model
that was in use in Chernobyl, Ukraine, site of the world’s worst nuclear
accident. But the Russian-designed VVER-440 light water reactors do not
meet the safety standards of Western nations. The design is considered
unsafe and should not be in operation.
Conclusions
1. Three of the VVER projects started by the former Soviet Union during
the late 70’s and early 80’s encountered serious problems that led to
their suspension. Of these three, two found solutions to their problems
through the technical and financial help of other countries. Only
Juragua remains uncompleted
2. The Cuban government is again, since 2002, actively seeking financial
and technical assistance to finish Juragua. Feasibility studies indicate
that $400 million dollars are needed to finish the first reactor. Once
construction is resumed, a 14 month time span will be needed to make
operational the reactor.
3. The civil construction of the first reactor is 97% complete.
Approximately 40% of the reactor equipment is installed.
4. In the event of an accident during Juragua’s operation, radioactivity
could leak from the plant with an adverse effect upon Cuba, United
States, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.
5. The release of radioactive to the air from a nuclear plant is more
effective than the one produced from nuclear tests. Meteorological data
conducted by the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, and
the Air Resources Laboratory, ARL, show an early arrival of
radioactivity to Florida of less than 24 hours. The average time of
arrival would be 48 hours. In 72 hours, areas affected will be Central
America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and most of the U.S. Eastern Seaboard.
6. The cities with a major impact in the U.S. will be Miami, Florida;
Houston, Texas, and Tallahassee, Florida.
7. The main problems concerning safety related to the Juragua’s reactor
are:
· Deficiencies in the construction concerning the limitation of
discharges to the surroundings in case of breaches in pipes of more than
32 mm in the primary circuit.
· Lack of safety containment surrounding the core
· Limited capacity of the cooling system
· Insufficient backup of the cooling system and safety system
· Lack of distinction between control systems and safety precautions
concerning fire
· Obsolete control room technology
· Neutron irradiation of the reactor tank could cause the steel to
brittle
· Reactor dome has a retention capability to withstand only 7 pounds of
pressure per square inch. Standard in the U.S. is 50 pounds per square
inch
· Unknown quality of plant equipment and construction
· Lack of documentation on design, manufacturing and construction
· Reported instances of poor quality materials being re-worked at plant
site.
· Reactor protection systems and diagnostic behind Western standards
· Separation of the plant safety systems, and protection for control
room operators are below Western standards
8. The possibility of an accident occurring at Juragua, upon its
operation, is estimated to be 15 times greater than the probabilities in
a United States plant.
9. Cuba lacks a comprehensive system to perform systematic readings that
monitor radioactivity to prevent potential accidents.
10. Six similar reactors of the Juragua type operating in Eastern Europe
were shut down due to the lack of security of the reactors.
11. The IEAA performed in 1991 a safety analysis of the 10 reactors
similar to the Juragua’s, remaining in operation, and found 100 safety
aspects connected to the design and the operation of the plants. More
than 60% of these aspects are of great importance, and are not
acceptable by Western standards.
12. The group of the world’s seven richest countries (G7) has concluded
that all
reactors of the VVER-440 type must be shut down as soon as possible, and
the reactors should be upgraded to Western safety standards. The World
Bank emphasizes the serious defects of the reactors of this type,
rendering any
reconstruction unprofitable.
13. Integral reactor systems-including the reactor vessel itself, six
steam generators, five primary coolant pumps, twelve isolation valves
and more-were stored outside for months, exposed to the highly corrosive
tropical sea air and weather. Also, no nuclear reactor of Soviet design
has ever been constructed in a tropical climate.
14. Cuba has not serious plans at this point for the proper disposal of
the nuclear waste generated in Juragua, once in operation. Cuba is not
technically or economically prepared to dispose safely of the nuclear
waste
The Juragua nuclear plant should not be permitted to start operation
under the responsibility of the actual Cuban government, neither under
the present design and construction deficiencies. Radiological
dispersion devices –dirty bombs- among other dangerous activities
related to the plant, would be then of rather easy development by the
Cuban government using the nuclear waste disposal from the plant. |
|
|
|
 |
JURAGUA NUCLEAR PLANT - CIENFUEGOS, CUBA
|
|
|
 |
|
JURAGUA NUCLEAR PLANT - CIENFUEGOS, CUBA |
|
|
 |
|
AVERAGE TIME IN DAYS FOR RADIOACTIVE FALL OUT
TO REACH NEARBY REGIONS |
|
|
|
|
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Publications of the Center for Security Policy, No. 92-D-41
2. Report by U.S. Council of Energy Awareness: “The VVER design is very
different from Western counterparts, and does not meet Western safety
standards”, April, 1992
3. Nuclear Energy Information Center, “Source Book on Soviet Designed
Nuclear power Plants”, 1996
4. The Natural Resources Defense Council, “Backgrounders: The Juragua
Nuclear Plant”, 1997
5. Fisher-Thompson, Jim, “Recent Film Reveals Flaws of Cuban Nuclear Plant”
U.S. Information Agency, August, 1995
6. “Nuclear Safety: Concerns with the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba”,
Statement of Keith O. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General , Resources
Community, and Economic Development Division, United States General
Accounting Office, to the House of Representatives, Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, August,
1995
7. International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular, INFCIRC/537,
July 1997
8. International Atomic Energy Agency, “International Conference on
Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe”
9. Berger, Mikhail, “Cuba Hopes for Return of Absurd Economics”, 1996
10. Cereijo, Manuel, “Facing the Threat of Juragua”, June 1995
11. Dillion, Paul, “Nuclear Threat Looms Nearby”, November, 1997
12. Robinson, Roger. Cuba and the Juragua Nuclear Power Complex. Testimony
From a Hearing of the house International Relations Committee. Subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere, August, 1995
13. U.S. Congress. General Accounting Office. Nuclear Safety: Concerns about
the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba. 101th Cong. 2nd. Session RECD-92-262,
1992
14. Rohter, Larry. “ Cuban A-Plant worries U.S. over safety”, February, 1995
15. Fonticiella, Herminia; Arrondo, Raul; Fonticiella, L. “The Inherent
Danger of
The Juragua Nuclear Power Plant”, May 1996
16. Thomas Nielsen; Nils Boehmer; “Kola Nuclear Power Plant”, July 2000
17. Russian Ministry of Security, Report No. 1344-G, July 1992
18. Murray, R. “Understanding Radioactive Wasre”, 4th Edition, Battelle
Memorial Institute, Ohio 1994
19. BEIR V., Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionization Radiations,
National Research Council, 1990
20. “Nuclear Energy’s Dilemma: Disposing of Radioactive Waste safely”,
Comptroller General of the United States, 1977
21. “Nuclear Safety”, GAO/RCED-97-72
22. Report DOE/EIA-0219, April 1999
23. CREWS Proposal, June 1999
24. Nuclear Waste Briefs, Winter 1996
25. Report # DOE/EIA-0383, December 1999
26. Inventory of Electric Utility Power Plants in the United States 1999
Executive Summary, EIA/DOE, 1999
27. TED Case Studies #469, August 1999
28. Nucleus, X aniversario SEAN, Comision de Energia Atomica de Cuba, No.7
1989
29. Boletin Tecnico, Central Atomica de Juragua, Centro de Informacion
Cientifico Tecnica de la UPI, No.7, 1988
30. Boletin Tecnico, Vol. III, No. 1-2, Centro de Informacion Cientifico
Tecnica,
Cuba, 1990
31. Personal conversations of the author with numerous Cuban engineers,
scientists, technicians, workers, and government officials, 1988-2000. |
|
|
|
INFOCUBA
