|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
ARE WE SAFE YET?
MANUEL CEREIJO
We may no longer feel like we are living on the knife edge of 9/11. But
perhaps we should. In terms of radiological, nuclear, and biological
attacks, we are still as vulnerable as ever.
There are two sets of comparable importance in regards to nuclear
threat. but different character. The first is nuclear terrorism. This
would involve a nuclear weapon stolen, probably from Russia, and
provided to a terrorist organization, or nation. The greatest danger is
the smuggling of such a weapon in a cargo container or light aircraft,
which could land without interception in the United States. Cuba’s
proximity to the US is an ideal departure for such light plane.
Transporting the nuclear warhead by car or van to a densely populated
area and detonating it on a workday could ensure 100,000 to 300,000
deaths. From blast, fire, and local fallout. The same kind of damage
could be produced by detonating a nuclear weapon in the harbor of a
large city.
To be sure, deploying stolen nuclear weapons requires time and talent to
bypass their use-control mechanisms. But there is also the possibility
of improvised nuclear explosives based on highly enriched uranium (HEU),
again probably obtained from Russia. Some 60Kg of HEU would be required,
but the weapon could be fabricated in a basement or office, and would
predictably yield 10-20 kilotons of explosive yield. This too would kill
100,000 to 300,000 people.
The second threat lies in conventional attack on the 103 operating
nuclear reactors in the United States. A meltdown could occur through
either sabotage or attack by a light aircraft loaded with explosives.
Such a meltdown would condemn about 10,000 people to death by cancer and
would have disastrous consequences for the economy, because 20% of US
electric power comes from nuclear reactors.
There is also the potential damage of a radiological bomb. A
radiological bomb, or dirty bomb, is a mixture of nuclear material, in
smaller amount, with conventional explosives. The damage of a
radiological bomb, exploded in the center of a large city, on a weekday,
although smaller than a conventional nuclear weapon, could cause some
5,000 deaths.
A biological attack, such as with small pox, so as to infect some 50,000
primary cases (and 150,000 secondary within two weeks, 450,000 within 4
weeks, and so on) result in almost everyone here being exposed and 30%
dying among the infected. This would threaten the survival of the United
States and even of world civilization.
The impact would be so huge because smallpox is both infectious and
contagious. If “herd immunity” by vaccination is obtained, by say, 80%
vaccination, then 15,000 primary cases would ultimately contribute
perhaps 50,000 infections.
The threat and the actuality of terrorism are real and serious.
APPENDIX I
Of the countless scenarios of terrorist mayhem, none quickens the pulse
quite like the menace of a nuclear bomb, and for good reason. A nuclear
weapon embodies essentially everything a terrorist could hope for: the
ability to kill at least tens of thousands of people at once, a fiery
explosion that reverberates globally in images of death and destruction,
and a lingering, lethal legacy, in the form of radioactive fallout.
Fortunately, most groups and terrorist nations are limited in their
resources and lack the infrastructure to build a nuclear bomb. But, why
build a bomb when there are far cheaper and simpler ways of waging
nuclear terror?
There are two other possibilities that, for their comparative
simplicity, would deliver much of the bang of a bomb. Flying a fully
fueled jumbo jet into a nuclear reactor is one. The other is using
radioactive nuclear materials to kill or sicken people or render tracts
of land uninhabitable by, for example, scattering the materials with a
conventional explosion.
Nuclear reactors are surrounded by a massive containment structure with
concrete-and-steel walls more than a meter thick. These containments
were designed to withstand earthquakes and extremely violent impacts,
but not the sort a plunging jumbo jet would cause if fully loaded with
fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in
Vienna, Austria.
In a 26 September release, the agency suggested that such an impact
would not trigger a runaway nuclear reaction, because automatic safety
systems would flood the reactor with water. A direct hit by a large,
fueled aircraft might nevertheless breach the containment and damage the
reactor, possibly causing a leak of radioactive steam and fallout.
The IAEA’s assessment predicts that the worst damage would be confined
within 10 Kms. of the plant. Even so, dangerous levels of radioactivity
would likely persist for 10 to 15 years.
Radiological dispersion devices-the poor man’s nuclear weapon-, or dirty
bomb, are another possibility likely to attract increasing interest from
terrorists. Scattering radiation without a nuclear explosion, they are a
near-term terrorist threat. Several nations-including a few sponsors of
terrorism-have dabbled in dispersion devices. Cuba, by the way, has two
research reactors.
Spent fuel is the obvious choice for the radioactive material in a
terrorist device. Many tens of thousands of tons of it lie scattered
around the world, including small accumulations in Iran, Algeria, Libya,
Syria, and Cuba.
A single, half-ton spent fuel assembly from a reactor contains more than
enough radioactivity to put a transportation terminal or some other
strategic location out of action for months, or years, if the
radioactivity is well dispersed.
The most accessible nuclear device for any terrorist would be a
radiological dispersion bomb. This so-called 'dirty bomb' would consist
of waste by-products from nuclear reactors wrapped in conventional
explosives, which upon detonation would spew deadly radioactive
particles into the environment.
This is an expedient weapon, in that radioactive waste material is
relatively easy to obtain. Radioactive waste is widely found throughout
the world, and in general is not as well guarded as actual nuclear
weapons. In the United States, radioactive waste is located at more than
70 commercial nuclear power sites in 31 states. Enormous quantities also
exist overseas — in Europe and Japan in particular. Tons of wastes are
transported long distances, including between continents (Japan to
Europe and back).
Cuba, since 1988 has two experimental nuclear reactors in La Habana.
Very low power. One is a 10 Watts. The other is referred to as zero
Watts. They are used for nuclear medicine and research on nuclear
biotechnology. But they do generate nuclear waste.
In Russia, security for nuclear waste is especially poor, and the
potential for diversion and actual use by Islamic radicals has been
shown to be very real indeed. In 1996, Islamic rebels from the
break-away province of Chechnya planted, but did not detonate, such a
device in Moscow's Izmailovo park to demonstrate Russia's vulnerability.
This dirty bomb consisted of a deadly brew of dynamite and one of the
highly radioactive by-products of nuclear fission — Cesium 137. Extreme
versions of such gamma-ray emitting bombs, such as a dynamite-laden
casket of spent fuel from a nuclear power plant, would not kill quite as
many people as died on Sept. 11. worst-case calculation for an explosion
in downtown Manhattan during noontime: more than 2,000 deaths and many
thousands more suffering from radiation poisoning.
Treatment of those exposed would be greatly hampered by inadequate
medical facilities and training. The United States has only a single
hospital emergency room dedicated to treating patients exposed to
radiation hazards, at Oak Ridge, Tenn. A credible threat to explode such
a bomb in a U.S. city could have a powerful impact on the conduct of
U.S. foreign and military policy, and could possibly have a paralyzing
effect. Not only would the potential loss of life be considerable, but
also the prospect of mass evacuation of dense urban centers would loom
large in the minds of policy-makers.
The threat from radiological dispersion dims in comparison to the
possibility that terrorists could build or obtain an actual atomic bomb.
An explosion of even low yield could kill hundreds of thousands of
people. A relatively small bomb, say 15-kilotons, detonated in Manhattan
could immediately kill upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, followed by a
comparable number of deaths in the lingering aftermath. Fortunately,
bomb-grade nuclear fissile material (highly enriched uranium or
plutonium) is relatively heavily guarded in most, if not all, nuclear
weapon states.
Nonetheless, the possibility of diversion remains. Massive quantities of
fissile material exist around the world. Sophisticated terrorists could
fairly readily design and fabricate a workable atomic bomb once they
manage to acquire the precious deadly ingredients (the Hiroshima bomb
which used a simple gun-barrel design is the prime example).
Obviously, intelligence that helps localize the bomb is the main key to
success. Just as obviously, intelligence of such quality is seldom
available — as proven on Sept. 11. Such a search could be truly looking
for a needle in a haystack, as detection normally would succeed only if
the detectors come within a few feet or so of the hidden bomb. Disabling
a bomb is easy by comparison.
A radiological bomb might be surrounded by a tent enclosure several tens
of feet in height and width, then filled with a special foam to contain
the deadly radioactive material (such as Cesium 137) if the bomb
explodes during further defusing attempts.
For a nuclear device there are available a set of options for disabling
the weapon, including using explosives to wreck the bomb's wiring to
prevent the triggering of the nuclear detonators. Because of the
difficulty inherent in finding a nuclear weapon once it entered the
country, near-term U.S. response efforts would be best focused on
prevention and intervention to secure possible sources of nuclear
terrorism.
A state sponsor of terrorism would simply give the spent fuel or perhaps
even an entire dispersion device to terrorist groups. We must be on the
alert, and start thinking from the terrorist’s perspective of maximizing
the destruction. |
|
|
|
|
|
INFOCUBA
