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TERRORISM
CUBA IN THE MIDDLE EAST
A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY
DOMINGO AMUCHASTEGUI
Foreword By
Haim Shaked, Director
Middle East Studies Institute
July, 1999
Contents:
INTRODUCTION | CHRONOLOGY |
GLOSSARY | BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION
After a close relationship with Middle Eastern groups and countries for
forty years, Cuba enjoys today an exceptional position in the region
with embassies in almost all countries, and with a wide variety of
political connections within the ruling elites. Castro is engaged in a
growing process of enlarging bilateral trade, financial assistance,
involvement in joint ventures, and cooperation projects, as well as in
diplomatic cooperation in the international system.
The context has changed over the years. While the priorities are not to
channel weapons to groups within the region, there are still some
specialized military assistance, training and cooperation, especially
with the PLO. Yet Cuba's priorities now are to obtain investments,
economic cooperation, and trade opportunities from Iran, Algeria,
Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and others.
For U.S. interests, the closeness of the relationship with Iraq and some
of the more militant terrorist groups in the Middle East is troublesome.
Can Cuba be used to carry out terrorist acts against U.S. targets? Is
there any cooperation between Sadam Hussein and Castro in the
development of chemical and bacteriological weapons? What remains from
the close cooperation between Castro and the more militant terrorist
groups in the region? These and other questions are of critical
importance to the security of the United States. Cuba's proximity to the
U.S., the continuous flow of immigrants from the island and the
increased travel from and to Cuba should make Castro's relationships a
troublesome and worrysome issue to U.S. policymakers.
The Middle East and North Africa have been extremely important to
Castro's foreign policy since 1959. It remains today as a region of
special priority in Castro's redesign of his foreign policy after the
collapse of Cuba's alliance with the former Soviet Union. Actually,
there is not one single aspect of Castro's foreign policy in which the
Middle East does not become important as:
1) A region connected to Cuba's non-aligned interests and policies.
2) An area where Cuba laid the foundations for the deployment of regular
military forces and the establishment of military cooperation over the
last 40 years.
3) A region from where to gain knowledge/connections/influence with
"liberation movements" throughout Africa and the Middle East.
4) A base for triangular operations in connection with
Intelligence/subversive activities in Latin America.
5) A source of influence with Arab communities in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
6) A region in which trade, loans, cooperation, and diplomatic support
has become very important, especially in the 1990's.
7) After Vietnam, a virtual laboratory, in the military field, in
particular since the Six Day War (1967), for updating and upgrading
Cuba's military capabilities, including technological and operational
capacities.
8) A region where the Arab-Islamic states are extremely important due to
their voting power within the UN system for Cuba's multilateral
diplomacy.
It is within such a context that the relevance of the Middle East for
Cuba's foreign policy should be understood. The following chronology is
only meant to be illustrative of the depth and closesness of Cuba’s
long-standing relationships with states, leaders, and groups in this
troubled region.
CHRONOLOGY
1959-1963
* Relations developed with Gamal Abdel Nasser; Cuba joined the
Non-Aligned Movement, sponsored by India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. Efforts
to buy weapons from Egypt failed.
* The Cuban government sent Captain José Ramón Fernández (currently
vicepresident of the Cuban government) to Israel in the summer of 1959
to negotiate the purchase of light weaponry and artillery, but no
agreement was reached. Instead, significant civilian assistance was
granted by Israel to Cuba for more than 10 years in the field of citrus
cultivation and diplomatic relations were normal until 1973.
* Raúl Castro and Che Guevara visited Cairo and established contacts
with African liberation movements stationed in and supported by Cairo.
Both Cuban leaders visited Gaza and expressed support for the
Palestinian cause.
* Initial relations established with Baghdad under Karim Kassem. The
Cuban government sent Commander William Galvez to purchase light
weaponry, tanks and artillery. No agreement was reached.
* Castro established relations with the Algerian FLN through Paris and
Rabat; official and public support was extended, large quantities of
weapons were shipped to the FLN through Morocco (1960-1961); provided
shelter, medical and educational services were provided in Cuba for
wounded Algerians; political and military cooperation in the fields of
counter-intelligence and intelligence were initiated. First Cuban
deployment of regular military forces in support of the Algerian
government against the Moroccan aggression of 1963. These forces remain
to train the Algerian army for more than a year.
1964-1967
* With considerable hesitation and reluctance, Nasser cooperated with
Che Guevara during his guerrilla operation in Congo-Kinshasa (former
Zaire) in 1965.
* Cuba welcomed the founding of the PLO. First contacts with Palestinian
FATAH between 1965 (Algiers) and 1966-67 (Damascus).
* The Tricontinental Conference was held in Havana in January, 1966 to
adopt a common political strategy against colonialism, neocolonialism,
and imperialism.
* Cuba sent weapons via Cairo, to the NLF in Southern Yemen. Cuban
agents were sent on fact-finding missions to North and South Yemen
(1967- 1968);
* Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials privately criticized in very
harsh terms the shameful performance of the Egyptian leadership during
the Six Day War in 1967. The war, as such, was thoroughly studied by the
Cuban Armed Forces;
* Cuba and Syria developed a close alliance and supported FATAH and the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).
1968-1975
* Cuba continued its military and political support for FATAH after the
Syrians broke with the latter, and, later on, Cuban support was granted
to other Palestinian organizations (Popular and Democratic fronts).
* Cuba sent military instructors and advisors into Palestinian bases in
Jordan to train Palestinian fedayeen (1968); first high-level delegation
from FATAH-PLO visited Cuba (1970).
* Several missions sent to Southern Yemen to support NLF / FATAH Ismail
internally and externally, both politically and militarily.
* The Soviet Union and Cuba increased military and civilian cooperation
with Southern Yemen (PDRY).
* Cuba commenced political and military cooperation with Somalia's Siad
Barre (1969).
* Economic cooperation began with Libya in 1974, after serious bilateral
tensions between 1969 and 1973.
* Closer connections with FATAH-PLO and other Palestinian organizations
were reinforced, including training of Latin American guerrillas in
Lebanon;
military support included counter-intelligence and intelligence
training.
* Arafat visited Cuba in 1974.
* Arab and Non-Aligned countries pressured Cuba to break relations with
Israel in 1973 and sponsor U.N. Resolution on Zionism "as a form of
racial discrimination."
* Cuba provided military support and personnel to Syria during the Yom
Kippur War (1973-1975).
* Cuba joined with Algeria and Libya on a diplomatic/political offensive
in support of Frente POLISARIO (People's Front for the Liberation of
Western Sahara and Río del Oro); later on provided military cooperation
, medical services, and other forms of assistance.
1976-1982
* Cuba avoided any public condemnation of Syria's military intervention
in Lebanon, although privately they did so in strong terms.
* Cuba supported the so-called "Steadfastness Front" against the U.S.
backed Camp David accord.
* Additional military and political support provided to the Palestinian
cause; Arafat attended the 6th Non-Aligned Conference in Havana (1979).
* At this stage, significant hard currency loans (tens of million) had
been facilitated by Arafat-PLO to the Cuban government under very soft
terms; Cuba granted diplomatic and political support to Arafat during
the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In the 1980s, Cuban universities
were graduating hundreds of Palestinian students in various fields,
especially from medical schools.
* The Aden (South Yemen) regime decided to support the Ethiopian radical
officers commanded by Mengistu Haile Mariam, sending Yemeni military
units in support of the latter against Somali aggression, and asking the
Cubans to do the same. Cuba joined in, first with a group of officers
headed by General Arnaldo Ochoa, a move that was followed later on by
the deployment of large Cuban forces against the Somali invasion. Also
as part of the alliance with the Aden regime, Cuba granted some
small-scale support to the Dhofaris in their armed struggle against the
monarchy in Oman until the late 1970s.
* As part of Cuba's alliance with Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in
Ethiopia, the Cuban leadership decided to engage in active political and
military support for more than 10 years to the Liberation Movement of
Southern Sudan headed by John Garang against the Arab-Muslim regime in
Khartoum (until today there are no diplomatic relations between Khartoum
and Havana).
* Cuba developed closer ties with Iraq in various areas (medical
services, construction projects, grants and loans).
* Cuban military advisory to Iraq in different fields began in the mid
1970s (it was cancelled after the Iraq invasion of Iran in late 1980).
* Cuba cooperated with Libya in the political founding of the World
MATHABA in Tripoli, to provide political support and coordinate
revolutionary movements throughout the world. Cuba supported also
Lybia's stand on Chad and in its support to the FRENTE POLISARIO.
* Despite its close links with Baghdad, Cuba recognized and praised the
Iranian Revolution, although with no significant increase in bilateral
ties. Once Iraq attacked Iran, Cuba withdrew its military advisors from
Baghdad and adopted a position of official impartiality, though more
sympathetic to Baghdad, due to its past relations.
* Castro granted political recognition to the revolution in Afghanistan
in 1978, but internecine conflict and civil war prevented any
strengthening of bilateral relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979 disrupted Cuba's Non-Aligned policies at a time when Castro was
chairman of the NL Movement. While publicly supporting Moscow, Fidel
Castro was very critical of the Soviet invasion, something that was
bitterly discussed with Soviet officials.
1983-1991
* Declining economic cooperation between Cuba and Libya.
* New ties of alliance between Algeria and Libya with Morocco cut-off
any further direct support from Cuba to FPOLISARIO.
* Libyan support to Latin American revolutionary movements, especially
in Central America and the whole of the World MATHABA project, declined
rapidly after the U.S.bombing of Tripoli in 1986; Cubans increasingly
distant until MATHABA's last meeting in 1990 in Tripoli, where the
termination of the Libyan project was pretty obvious for all the
participants, including the Cuban delegation.
* The Palestinian Intifada increases Cuba’s support for Arafat and the
PLO, both diplomatic and military.
* Cuba starts exploring other possibilities for increased diplomatic
recognition and economic ties in the region, including Saudi Arabia (two
Cuban ambassadors were sent for that purpose, but with no significant
success); the Gulf States, Jordan, Turkey (with much better results:
embassies were finally established in Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, and
Jordan); and even Israel (with no official success, but with promising
inroads within the private sector and some political/religious forces).
* After the violent collapse of the Aden regime, the death of Fatah
Ismail, andthe reunification with North Yemen, Cuban authorities
negotiated with the government of Sanaa from which bilateral relations
continued to develop, including areas of economic and political
cooperation.
* After the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Palestinian
National Authority, Cuban-Palestinian military cooperation was enhanced,
including the areas of counter-intelligence and intelligence.
* Cuba condemned Iraq for its invasion and annexation of Kuwait,
supporting the latter's sovereignty; it also condemned U.S. military
operations in the Gulf and abstained from supporting the bulk of the
sanctions imposed on Baghdad. A Cuban military delegation was sent to
Iraq to learn and share what was considered vital information and
experiences from U.S. combat operations in Kuwait and Iraq.
1992-1999
* Embassies were opened in Qatar, Turkey, Tunisia and Jordan; trade and
joint ventures were developed. Diplomatic ties and trade relationships
have increased discreetly with Egypt and Libya; Qatar supported Cuba in
the 1999 sessions on Human Rights at Geneva.
* A high-level PLO military delegation including the new head of
Intelligence paid a non-public visit to Cuba.
* Israeli firms provided capital, technology and markets to Cuba in the
field of citrus cultivation and exports; religious and political
delegations visited were exchanged..
* Lebanon's normalization in the 1990's allowed Cuba to reach important
financial and trade agreements, including Lebanese participation in
joint ventures and in establishing a branch of the Fransabank in Havana.
Nabih Berri, in 1998, the Chairman of the Lebanese parliament paid a
long and successful, visit to Cuba during the month of Ramadan, and more
recently Adnan Kassar, president of the Fransabank and the International
Chamber of Commerce paid an official visit to Havana.
* Iranian-Cuban relations have increased after several high-ranking
delegations from Iran visited Cuba: the Vice-President, the Minister of
Foreign Relations, the Minister of Public Health, and the Minister of
Social Assistance. The Cuban Minister of Public Health visited Iran in
1998. In the last two years the number of Cuban doctors, paramedics, and
medical services hired by Teheran have increased, together with
additional purchases of Cuban pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
products. A recent agreement (1999) was signed, establishing Cuba's
assistance in setting up social security/social assistance networks in
Iran.
* The recent election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika (April 1999) as President
of Algeria, opens new opportunities for Cuba, given Bouteflika's close
relationship with the Cuban government for more than 40 years.
* PLO leaders continue to have close relations with the Cuban
leadership, having access to specialized military and intelligence
training, either in Cuba or Palestinian territory, and in the sharing of
intelligence.
* Cuba continues to actively undermine U.S. policies in the Middle East
and North Africa in primarily three ways: a) Portraying U.S. actions and
diplomacy in the region as those of an aggressor, seeking to impose
hegemony by force such as the recurrent attacks on Iraq, violation of
sovereign rights (no-fly zones), the perpetuation of unjustified
economic sanctions to countries in the region (Iraq, Iran, Syria), open
political intervention and the use of brutal force as acts of
retaliation (the Bin Laden case/Yugoslavia); b) portraying the U.S. as
the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the Israel/Palestine and
the Gulf conflicts, and c) discrediting U.S. policies, especially by
gaining support for Cuba's agenda at the U.N. These Anti-American views
and policies are conveyed as a systematic message through a network of
Cuban embassies in most countries of the region, at the U.N. and its
multilateral system plus Cuban embassies and missions throughout the
Western Hemisphere and other significant non-governmental political and
cultural channels.
GLOSSARY
1. FLN. Front de Libération National, the political and military
organization that led the war of national liberation against French
colonial rule between 1954 and 1962. Ruling political party until the
1980s in Algeria.
2. PLO. Palestine Liberation Organization, founded in Cairo, in 1964,
under the auspices of Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic) to
serve Nasser's manipulations of the Palestinian cause, composed mostly
of conservative Palestinian intellectuals and bureaucrats serving Arab
governments. An instrument of Nasser's foreign policy until the June War
of 1967, when the old PLO leadership collapsed to be replaced by FATEH's
leadership headed by Arafat.
3. FATEH. Acronym for Palestine National Liberation Movement, founded in
1959 by younger generations of Palestinians that had experienced the
defeats of 1948 and 1956, strongly committed to a radical nationalist
platform to fight for Palestine and against Arab intervention and
manipulations of the Palestinian problem. Mostly an underground and not
legally recognized organization until the June War in 1967; it
transformed itself into the most powerful and influential party inside
Palestinian and Arab politics, controlling the PLO effectively since
1969, when Arafat becomes its chairman.
4. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The most important
branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (known as the ANM, created in
the 1950s as radical followers of Nasser). After the June War of 1967
splitting away from Nasser and focusing on building a more radical
alternative within the Palestinians under the name of Popular Front, led
by George Habash; a later off-spring, in 1969, was the Democratic Front
led by Nayef Hawatmeh. Strongly based in Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and the
Gulf, until 1970 heavily engaged in terrorist methods. After 1970
dropped such tactics, became more active and open across the occupied
territories and southern Lebanon, adopting Marxist-Leninist ideology.
5. Frente POLISARIO. Frente Popular de Liberación del Sagía el Hamra y
Río del Oro, inspired by the ANM tradition and the Algerian FLN, created
to fight against the Spanish-Morrocan-Mauritinian arrangements to split
the former colony of Saguía el Hamra/Río del Oro (known as Western
Sahara) between the two African states. Enjoyed active support from
Algeria and Libya together with a considerable number of African states
until the 1980s.
6. NFL. National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, another
important, and successful, branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement.
Created in 1962 in the course of the revolution in North Yemen, against
the monarchy and supported by Nasser. Expanded to the south of Yemen and
began armed struggle against British colonial occupation and local
feudal lords (sultans and sheikhs). Broke with Nasser in 1966-1967 and
finally forced the British to negotiate and evacuate Aden, followed by
the defeat of the local feudal lords. Since 1965 it has had very close
relations with Cuba. Main leader was Abdel Fatah Ismail. Internecine
conflicts sine the late 1970s eventually led to open civil war in 1990
and the collapse of the regime, the death of Fatah Ismail, and
integration with the north under the control of the government in Sanaa.
7. World MATHABA. A Libyan project from the late 1970s to promote
political, financial, and military support for revolutionary movements
throughout the world. Ghaddafi called on other "revolutionary
governments" to support this project, which Cuba did although with
extreme caution and distrust. Cuba could not refuse to join due to the
fact that its major allies in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East,
and even the Soviet Union had accepted to participate and that many of
them were benefitting from Libya's abundant financial support. Although
governments -like the case of Cuba- took part at the level of political
deliberations and to coordinate common actions in the diplomatic and
political fields, MATHABA was something else: essentially a tool in the
hands of the Libyans to project their individual goals and agenda
(Ghaddafi's Green Book, to reward his supporters, and to undermine his
enemies). Financial and military assistance was never a collective
decision, but responded for the most part to bilateral arrangements
between Ghaddafi's regime and individual organizations, some of which
resorted, at different stages, to terrorist methods like the IRA and
ETA. Insurgencies in Central America, like the Sandinistas and others,
were privileged beneficiaries along with the African National Congress,
FRENTE POLISARIO, and others. Cuban leaders were always anxious to
counterbalance Libyan attempts for unilateral actions, to influence
Cuban allies or about Ghaddafi's hostility toward well-known Cuban
allies such as Arafat. The dominant perception among Cuban leaders was
that Ghaddafi posed too many unnecessary security risks the U.S. and too
many complications within Cuban alliances.
8. People's Liberation Movement of Southern Sudan. The final outcome of
different secessionist movements in southern Sudan during the 1960s and
early 1970s (like the Anya-Nyas) fighting against Arab-Islamic control
of the central government, allocation of resources, and religious,
political, and ethnic intolerance.
9. Eritrean Liberation Front. The most influential Eritrean organization
fighting for secession from Ethiopia in the 1960s, actively supported by
the Syrian regime since 1965. Various internal divisions developed later
on until the late 1970s, when a new front was built based on very
different domestic and external alliances and, eventually led the
Eritreans to victory. Cuba's support to Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime
in 1978 meant the cessation of previous Cuban backing to the Eritrean
cause.
10. PDRY. People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, official name adopted
by the Southern Yemeni independent republic.
11. Gamal Abdel Nasser. A colonel in the Egyptian army, member of the
Free Officers Movement formed after the defeat in 1948 at the hands of
the newly-born state of Israel. Led the revolution that overthrew the
monarchy in 1952. Undertook signficant economic, social, and political
transformations, setting much of the basic tenets and role-model of Arab
nationalsm after WWII. Co-founder of the Neutralist countries in 1956
and of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Defeated by Israel in 1948,
1956, and 1967.
12. Karim Kassem. A colonel in the Iraqi army and, at the beginning, a
follower of Nasser. Led the revolution against the monarchy in 1958. A
rival of Nasser later on, a bloody military coup inspired and mostly led
by the Arab BAATH party, a strong and influential inter-Arab nationalist
movement in the Middle East, overthrew him in 1963.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CUBA'S POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH AFRICA
1. Anderson, Jon Lee (1997). Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life, New
York, Grove Press.
2. Baez, Luis (1996). Secreto de Generales, Ciudad de La Habana,
Ediciones SI-MAR, S.A.
3. B'nai B'rith (1982). "PLO Activities in Latin America," New York,
Anti-Defamation League.
4. Campbell, John C. "Soviet Policy in the Middle East." Current History
Num.80 (January 1981).
5. Durch, William J. ""The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East:
From Algeria to Angola."
Studies in Comparative Communism, Num. XI (Spring-Summer 1978).
6. The Economist Foreign Report. "Castro's First Middle East Adventure:
Part II."15 March, 1978.
7. Erisman, Michael H. (1985). Cuba's International Relations: The
Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy,Boulder, Westview.
8. Eran, Oded. "Soviet Middle East Policy: 1967-1973,"Rabinovich, Itamar
and Haim Shaked, eds. (1978). From June to October: The Middle East
Between 1967 and 1973, New Brunswick, Transaction Books.
9. Falk, Pamela S. (1986). Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest,
Massanchussets/Toronto,
D.C. Heath and Company.
10. Fernández, Damián (1988). Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East,
Boulder, Westview Press. 11. Karol, K.S. (1971). Guerrillas in Power,
London, Jonathan Cape.
12. Legum, Colim and Haim Shaked, eds. (1977-1980). The Middle East
Contemporary Survey. Vols. IIII, New York, Holmes and Meir.
13. "Relations Between the palestinian Terrorists and Cuba." Reprinted
from Lebanon: Selected Documents. Israeli, Raphael, ed., London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983.
14. Siljander, Mark. "The Palestine Liberation Organization in Central
America."Mmeo., October 1983.
15. U.S. Department of State. "The Sandinistas and the Middle Eastern
Radicals."Washington D.C., August 1985.
16. Viotti, Paul R. "Politics in the Yemens and the Horn of Africa:
Constraints on a Super Power."Mark V. Kauppi and R. craig Nations, eds.
The Soviet Union and the Middle east in the 1980s. Lexington, D.C.
Heath, 1983.
[1] Mr. Amuchastegui is a research associate at the Institute for Cuban
and Cuban-American Studies and a Doctoral candidate at the School of
International Studies, University of Miami. He was a professor at the
Higher Institute of International Relations in Havana; Guest Professor
at the Cuban National Defense College; Senior Researcher at Cuba's
Center for Studies of Africa and the Middle East; and Intelligence
Analyst and Head of the Organization Department at the Tricontinental
Organization in the 1960s and 1970s. He traveled extensively through
North Africa and the Middle East. He edited Palestine: Crisis and
Revolution (Havana, 1970); Palestine: Dimensions of a Conflict Sociology
and Politics in Israel Contemporary History of Asia and Africa (Four
Volumes, Havana, 1984-1988), together with several other books and
articles. He was a direct or indirect participant in most of the
developments described herein until 1993.
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